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Abstract
Background: Plague is a re-emerging disease and its pneumonic form is a high
priority bio-terrorist threat. Epidemiologists have previously analysed historical
outbreaks of pneumonic plague to better understand the dynamics of infection,
transmission and control. This study examines 3 relatively unknown outbreaks of
pneumonic plague that occurred in Suffolk, England, during the first 2 decades of
the twentieth century.
Methods: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test is used to compare the
symptomatic period and the length of time between successive cases (i.e. the serial
interval) with previously reported values. Consideration is also given to the case
fatality ratio, the average number of secondary cases resulting from each primary
case in the observed minor outbreaks (termed Rminor), and the proportion of
individuals living within an affected household that succumb to pneumonic plague
via the index case (i.e. the household secondary attack rate (SAR)).
Results: 2 of the 14 cases survived giving a case fatality ratio of 86% (95%
confidence interval (CI) = {57%, 98%}). For the 12 fatal cases, the average
symptomatic period was 3.3 days (standard deviation (SD) = 1.2 days) and, for the 11
non index cases, the average serial interval was 5.8 days (SD = 2.0 days). Rminor was
calculated to be 0.9 (SD = 1.0) and, in 2 households, the SAR was approximately 14%
(95% CI = {0%, 58%}) and 20% (95% CI = {1%, 72%}), respectively.
Conclusions: The symptomatic period was approximately 1 day longer on average
than in an earlier study but the serial interval was in close agreement with 2
previously reported values. 2 of the 3 outbreaks ended without explicit public health
interventions; however, non-professional caregivers were particularly vulnerable - an
important public health consideration for any future outbreak of pneumonic plague.
Background
Pneumonic plague is a disease that poses a threat to both civilian and military popula-
tions either via a biological aerosolised release or through zoonotic transmission [1].
Such routes of infection are not mutually exclusive since a biological attack in a non-
endemic plague region could lead to reservoirs of plague-infected animals after the
initial human infections have been controlled [2]. In addition, military populations are
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plague from abroad also provides a continuing threat to public health in the U.K., and
elsewhere [3]. It is therefore important to understand the epidemiology of pneumonic
plague in order to mitigate any outbreaks of the disease. The Japanese are believed to
have dropped plague-infected fleas over China during World War 2 [4] but due to a
lack of detailed descriptions of biological attacks, researchers have previously analysed
natural outbreaks to gain a better understanding of disease features such as the incuba-
tion/infectious periods and the potential for human-to-human transmission [3,5,6].
Prior to a single laboratory-acquired case of pneumonic plague at Porton Down in
1962, [7] the most recent English outbreaks occurred between 1906 and 1918 in Suf-
folk [8,9]. 3 outbreaks of pneumonic plague and 2 outbreaks of bubonic plague were
believed to have resulted from shipping on the Rivers Orwell and Stour. The most
likely explanation for these outbreaks is that grain brought from ports in the Black Sea
and the Americas contained plague-infected rats which lead to enzootic rat-flea plague
cycles. All of these outbreaks are particularly well documented and have been
described as “unique to western Europe” [8]. Although they have been reported in pre-
vious papers, this study uniquely analyses the statistical epidemiology of the 3 pneumo-
nic plague outbreaks. Unlike recent analyses, [10-12] the natural history and
transmissibility of the Suffolk cases were unaffected by effective treatment since anti-
biotics were not available until ~30 years after the last Suffolk outbreak.
Methods
Table 1 provides data describing the 3 pneumonic plague outbreaks [9,13] and Figure 1
shows a graphical representation of the data using epidemic trees [10]. A brief explana-
tion of each outbreak is given below.
Shotley outbreak, 1906/07
The index case, Mrs C (case 1), who lived in Charity Farm Cottages, developed what is
believed to be pneumonic plague on 9
th December 1906 and died 3 days later. She was
nursed by her daughter, Mrs R (case 2), who subsequently developed the disease on
17
th December and died on the 19
th December. Given the close contact of the 2 cases
it seems very likely that Mrs R was infected by her mother. Also, since evidence sug-
gests that transmission takes place when cases are coughing bloody sputum and near
death [14] then the approximate 5 day incubation period agrees with previously
reported values [3,15]. Interestingly, another daughter, Miss C (case 3) also became ill
on 20
th December but finally recovered. Miss C nursed both her mother and her sister;
it was assumed that Miss C was infected by her sister given that the time-course of
disease suggests she was less likely to have been infected by her mother.
The 2 daughters were both nursed by Mrs G (case 4) who lived approximately half a
mile away at Brickhill Terrace Cottages. Mrs G became ill on Christmas Eve and died
on Boxing Day; it was assumed that Mrs G was infected by Mrs R, the more seriously
ill of the 2 daughters. Mrs G seems to have infected her husband (case 6) and 2 sons
(cases 5 and 7) who all became symptomatic in quick succession between 27
th and
30
th December. The first son that experienced symptoms recovered. Mrs G’sm o t h e r ,
Mrs W (case 8), travelled over 20 miles to attend her daughter’sf u n e r a la n dt h e n
remained at Brickhill Terrace Cottages to nurse her son-in-law and 2 grandsons. Mrs
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rd January 1907 and died 3 days later; it was assumed that infection
occurred via Mrs W’ss o n - i n - l a w ,M rG ,s i n c eh ew a st h eo n l yc a s et oh a v ed i e d( a n d
thus experienced the late infectious stage) after Mrs W had arrived but prior to her
onset of symptoms.
Freston outbreak, 1910
Mrs C lived in Latimer Cottages with her husband, Mr C, and her 4 children from a
previous marriage. On 12
th September 1910, Mrs C’s daughter, Miss G (case 9), suf-
fered a bout of vomiting and died 4 days later after having experienced a severe cough
and diarrhoea. 5 days after the death of her daughter, Mrs C (case 10) began to experi-
ence similar symptoms and died after 2 days illness. 3 days after his wife’s death, Mr C
(case 11) and Mrs P (case 12), a neighbour living at Turkey Farm Cottages who had
nursed Mrs C, also became ill. The following day local doctors isolated both cases in
Table 1 Outbreak data
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Columns 2 - 6 copyright The Trustee, The Wellcome Trust, reproduced with permission; originally published in [9].
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requested to sleep in outhouses temporarily [16]. Mr C and Mrs P died on 29
th Sep-
tember; the same day that bacilli grown from blood specimens taken from these third
generation cases were identified as Yersinia pestis (the causative agent of plague). Sub-
sequently contacts of all cases were moved into isolation accommodation on 1
st Octo-
ber. The routes of transmission in this outbreak were relatively straight-forward to
deduce; the only debatable link is whether Mr C was infected via his step-daughter or
his wife. However, based on previous analysis [3,15] it is far more likely that Mr C
experienced an approximate 3 day incubation period having been infected by his wife
than incubating the disease for approximately 10 days after contact with the index
case.
Erwarton outbreak, 1918
Mrs B (case 13), who lived in Warren Lane Cottages, developed pneumonic plague
symptoms on 8
th June 1918 and died 5 days later. Mrs B was visited by her next-door
neighbour, Mrs G (case 14), who became ill on 16
th June. 2 days later the local general
practitioner, Dr Carey (who had attended all cases in the Shotley and Freston out-
breaks) visited Mrs G and suspected pneumonic plague after he found her with a high
temperature, spitting blood and breathing rapidly. Mrs G died the following day at
approximately the same time that pneumonic plague was bacteriologically confirmed
by a second doctor. Once again, the contacts of the 2 cases were subsequently moved
Figure 1 Epidemic trees of the 3 pneumonic plague outbreaks. The vertical grey lines separate the
numbered days of each outbreak. Circles and squares represent female and male cases, respectively. White
and black symbols represent time of symptom onset and death, respectively. Grey symbols represent time
of symptom onset for those cases that recovered. Case numbers are given above time of symptom onset
symbols. Dashed connectors represent the symptomatic period and un-dashed connectors represent
routes of transmission. Boxes represent different locations and dividing long-dashed lines represent
different cottages. C, B, L, T and W represent Charity Farm Cottages, Brickhill Terrace Cottages, Latimer
Cottages, Turkey Farm Cottages and Warren Lane Cottages, respectively.
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Page 4 of 10into isolated accommodation; in addition, all of the cases’ clothing and bedclothes were
burnt.
Results
The following analysis aggregates data from the 3 pneumonic plague outbreaks due to
their small sample sizes.
Symptomatic period
Figure 2a shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function following symptom onset. All
cases that died experienced at least 2 days of symptoms and survived for no longer
than 3 further days. 2 of the 14 cases survived the disease giving a case fatality ratio of
86% with a 95% binomial confidence interval of {57%, 98%}. Figure 2b shows a histo-
gram of the symptomatic period for the 12 fatal cases giving a mean and standard
deviation (SD) of 3.3 and 1.2 days, respectively. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test
showed evidence against the sample data here being drawn from the log-normal distri-
bution as reported by Gani & Leach [3] who calculated a mean and SD of 2.5 and 1.2
days, respectively (p-value = 0.02).







































































Figure 2 (a) Kaplan-Meier survival curve; dashed horizontal line represents 1-case fatality ratio, (b)
histogram of the symptomatic periods of fatal cases (n = 12), (c) histogram of the time between
successive cases (n = 11), (d) histogram of transmission (n = 12).
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The serial interval (symptom onset time in a primary case to symptom onset time in a
secondary case) could only be calculated for 11 of the 14 cases since the remaining 3
were index cases whose source of infection was not explicitly identified. The estimated
serial intervals ranged from 3 to 9 days with a mean and SD of 5.8 and 2.0 days,
respectively (Figure 2c). Nishiura et al. have previously reported 2 independent serial
interval distributions; the first giving a mean and SD of 5.7 and 3.6 days, respectively,
[5] and the second giving equivalent parameters of 5.1 and 2.3 days [6]. A KS test
revealed no evidence against the sample data here being drawn from either gamma dis-
tribution (first distribution p-value = 0.38, second distribution p-value = 0.22).
Secondary cases
Figure 2d shows a histogram of the number of secondary cases per primary case in the
observed minor outbreaks prior to the implementation of any control measures giving
a mean (termed Rminor) of 0.9 (SD = 1.0), slightly lower than the Rminor of 1.3 (SD =
1.8) reported by Gani & Leach [3]. A visual inspection of the histogram shows a simi-
lar shape to the geometric distribution provided by Gani & Leach and confirmed by
Lloyd-Smith et al., [17] but the KS test is only valid for testing against continuous dis-
tributions and therefore cannot be applied here. Despite this, the geometric distribu-
tion was again superior (Akaike’s Information Criterion with a correction for small
sample sizes (AICc) = 29.5) to either the Poisson (AICc = 32.7) or negative-binomial
(AICc = 35.6) models. The results here also compare favourably with the Rminor values
of 0.9 for Mukden in 1946 and 1.1 for Madagascar in 1957 [3]. Finally, there was insuf-
ficient data to provide any statistical comparison with the time-decreasing Rminor ana-
lysed by Nishiura et al., [6] although it is noteworthy that all 3 index cases here
infected only 1 other person.
Secondary attack rate
Let the household secondary attack rate (SAR) be defined as the number of secondary
cases resulting from each household index case divided by the number of household
contacts of each index case. The family living in Charity Farm Cottages, Shotley, con-
sisted of about 8 persons [13] giving a household SAR of 14% with a 95% binomial
confidence interval of {0%, 58%}. 3 children remained disease-free at Latimer Cottages,
Freston, giving a household SAR of 20% with a 95% binomial confidence interval of
{1%, 72%}. The early isolation of Mrs P prevented any further cases amongst her hus-
band or their 6 children [13] making the household SAR untenable for Turkey Farm
Cottages, Freston. It should be noted that 4 doctors, 3 nurses and 2 church members
also had close contact with the Freston cases but none of them developed the disease
[13,18]. The lack of information regarding the number of inhabitants at either Brickhill
Terrace Cottages, Shotley, or Warren Lane Cottages, Erwarton, means that the house-
hold SAR cannot be calculated for either residence.
Discussion
There seems to be sufficient evidence in the Erwarton outbreak to suggest that public
health interventions were implemented too late to prevent any further cases because
contacts were isolated at approximately the time of the second death (i.e. after any
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Shotley where pneumonic plague was only accepted as the disease responsible many
years later - all deaths were registered as being due to acute pneumonia and any expli-
cit isolation was not reported. It is important to note that Dr Carey, who attended
cases in all 3 outbreaks, undoubtedly encouraged barriers to close contact which may
have implicitly affected the epidemiology of each outbreak. In spite of this, Mr C and
Mrs P were still infected by Mrs C during the Freston outbreak even though Dr Carey
had impressed on those nursing Mrs C of the necessity of avoiding close contact
whenever possible [19]. This highlights the difficulty of quantifying such medical advice
from outbreak data - a subject perhaps more appropriately addressed through beha-
vioural research studies [20].
2 of the 3 Suffolk outbreaks were what are usually referred to as ‘minor outbreaks’
which by definition decline to extinction with or without the strong influence of public
health interventions. By analysing the entire transmission tree of a minor outbreak it is
natural that one calculates an Rminor estimate slightly smaller than 1; this consequence
is clear even without any explicit estimation. Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to
regard that the average number of secondary cases per primary case in a fully suscepti-
ble population (i.e. R0) of pneumonic plague is less than 1 in general and that pneumo-
nic plague is not capable of causing a major epidemic. For example, when evaluating
the major epidemic in Manchuria, 1910, [5] which was clearly dominated by human-
to-human transmission (due to confirmation of the absence of bubo amongst the
cases), R0 of pneumonic plague is definitely regarded as greater than 1. What the pre-
sent study and previous studies [3,6,17] have tended to analyse are examples in which
the outbreak declined to extinction before growing to a major epidemic, and thus, the
resulting estimate of the average number of secondary cases per single primary case is
not a true representation of R0.T h i si sa p p a r e n tf r o mb r a n c h i n gp r o c e s st h e o r yg i v e n
that an observation of a single epidemic is merely “as i n g l es a m p l ep a t hp r o f i l e ” [21].
Furthermore, the underlying social contact structure that predicates R0 is unclear in
many settings and so interpretation of transmissibility inferences between settings
requires care.
The case fatality ratio of pneumonic plague is often stated as approaching 100% and
so it is interesting that 14% of the Suffolk cases survived, although the small sample
size leads to wide confidence intervals. Of the 14 possible cases of pneumonic plague
only 3 were confirmed bacteriologically (Mr C and Mrs P at Freston, and Mrs G at
Erwarton). There can be little doubt that the other 2 cases at Latimer Cottages and
M r sBa tW a r r e nL a n eC o t t a g e sa l s oh a dt h ed isease [9]. However, it is possible that
the 2 surviving cases in Shotley did not experience pneumonic plague; indeed, all the
cases were originally believed to have beend u et oav i r u l e n tf o r mo fi n f l u e n z a[ 1 3 ] .
On the other hand, perhaps the strain of Y. pestis responsible for the Suffolk outbreaks
was less virulent than in other outbreaks resulting in a less than 100% case fatality
ratio. It is also possible that the 2 surviving Shotley cases could have initially suffered
from bubonic plague before displaying pneumonic symptoms, although no buboes
were reported. Interestingly, the presumed bubonic plague outbreak of 1909/1910 in
the nearby village of Trimley resulted in 7 cases and 4 deaths - 6 of these cases were
described as having a “knot” (enlarged gland) in the neck, axilla or groin [8].
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not behave like the ‘black death’ pandemic of the 14
th -1 7
th centuries (which killed a
quarter of the population of Europe) but more like sylvatic plague [9,22]. Enzootic
amongst wild rodents in many areas of the world, sylvatic plague (a term that is used
to reflect the ecological rather than the medical context of the disease) rarely results in
the infection of more than a few individuals or single households. Interestingly, the
index cases of all 3 outbreaks here seem to have followed a direct course of primary
pneumonic plague (which has also been associated with sylvatic plague [23]) rather
than experiencing the usual secondary effects after suffering bubonic symptoms. It
should be noted that there was 1 further case that experienced secondary pneumonic
plague - on 10
th October 1911, a sailor, Mr B, was admitted to the sick quarters of the
Royal Naval Barracks at Shotley. Mr B was probably infected 3 days earlier after he cut
himself while cleaning a rabbit that he had caught less than a mile from Latimer Cot-
tages, Freston. Soon after developing a severe pneumonia on 15
th October, Mr B was
isolated after inspection of his sputum suggested plague. No transmission occurred
and Mr B finally recovered on 12
th January 1912.
The last pandemic of plague started in China, 1894, and spread to many parts of the
world including India where over 1 million people were killed by the disease [9].
Plague reached Glasgow in 1900 [24] resulting in 36 bubonic cases and 16 deaths.
Prior to this outbreak, Britain remained effectively free from plague for nearly
250 years following the great plague of London (1665-1666) that caused 60,000 deaths
in a population of 450,000. The absence of plague was probably due to the introduc-
tion of the brown rat (Rattus norvegicus) which eventually replaced the common black
rat (Rattus rattus) [8]. Since the brown rat prefers to live apart from man, as opposed
to the black rat which prefers human habitations, the close contact required for flea-
based transmission is likely to have decreased over time. However, over 200 species of
wild rodents are capable of harbouring plague [8] and could act as a reservoir for
potential human infection following an aerosolised release of Y. pestis.I n d e e d ,t h e
small localised outbreaks seen in Suffolk could provide a model of potential secondary
outbreaks of plague after any initial epidemic has been curtailed, with domesticated
cats perhaps providing the most direct rodent-human link in contemporary western
society [25,22].
Conclusions
The average symptomatic period of the cases described here was almost 1 day longer
than that found by Gani & Leach [3] in their analysis of a variety of outbreaks,
although the 2-5 day range fell within previously reported values. The main difference
between the results of these 2 papers is that none of the cases here died within the
first day of experiencing symptoms whereas approximately 15% of cases suffered a
1 day infectious period in the Gani & Leach study. The smaller sample size of the Suf-
folk outbreaks perhaps offers the most likely explanation for this discrepancy; although
possible epidemiological differences cannot be ruled out. The average ~6 day serial
interval agrees closely with values reported by Nishiura et al. [5,6] and in 2 situations
where it was possible to estimate, the household SAR was approximately 15%, but
again the small sample sizes lead to wide confidence intervals. These outbreaks high-
l i g h tt h a tn o n - p r o f e s s i o n a lc a regivers are particularly vulnerable and would likely
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Page 8 of 10comprise the majority or non-index pneumonic plague cases following importation of
the disease or deliberate release of the causative organisms. Finally, it should be
emphasised that even with Rminor = 0.9, significant amplification of any index cases
could ensue through human-to-human transmission [3] and would need to be consid-
ered appropriately in terms of risk assessment and public health mitigation strategies.
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